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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Paul Bairas, 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
v. 
Lanard Johnson and Norman Cram, 
co-administrators of the estate of 
Philip G. Fulstow, deceased, 
Defendants-Respondents 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
No. 9599 
The appellant is herein referred to as plaintiff and 
respondents as defendants, as they appeared in the lower 
court. 
This reply brief answers new material set forth in 
respondents-defendants' brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. DEFENDANTS' CONTENTION THAT 
THE TRIAL COURT COULD NOT CONSIDER 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A CONTINU-
ANCE BECAUSE THE MOTION AND AFFI-
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DAVITS WERE NOT TIMELY FILED IS ER-
RONEOUS BECAUSE (1) THE MOTION WAS 
AN ORAL MOTION PROPERLY MADE IN 
OPEN COURT WHICH DID NOT REQUIRE 
PRIOR NOTICE AND (2) THE EARLIER RE-
QUIREMENT OF AFFIDAVITS IN SUPPORT 
OF THIS TYPE OF MOTION WAS REPEALED 
AND CLEARLY ABOLISHED BY THE ADOP-
TION OF RULE 40(b) UTAH RULES OF PRO-
CEDURE. 
At the trial, such as it was, on September 20, 1961, 
plaintiff made and repeated an oral motion for a con-
tinuance (R. 55, 58, 61, 71, 82), providing in support 
thereof two affidavits ( R. 40, 43, 73). Defendants 
vigorously opposed this motion on the ground that it was 
not timely filed, citing Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
6(d), 8(d) and 59(c) (R. 52). This same ground was 
repeatedly pressed upon the trial court (R. 53, line 17, 
29; R. 54, line 16; R. 60, line 15, 27; R. 67, line 9; 
R. 82, line 25). This continued and repeated insistence 
led the trial court into the error of assuming that the 
motion was, in fact, not timely (R. 73, line 13). 
Defendants continue to assert this ground here. It 
is a faulty argument, however, because none of the rules 
cited by defendants requires that a motion for contin-
uance be in writing or that notice thereof be given ahead 
of time if the motion is made in open court; nor do the 
citations require affidavits at all in support of the mo-
tion, let alone that they be filed ahead of time. Nor have 
we been able to find any currently in force statute or 
rule supporting the defendants' position. 
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In support of their position, defendants cited Rules 
6 ( d ) , 8 ( d ) and 59 (c) to the trial court ( R. 52) . Rule 
6 (d) refers only to the time that motions in writing 
must be served but it does not state that this motion 
must be in writing; Rule 8 (d) refers only to the failure 
to deny in the pleadings and we assume it to be an 
inadvertant slip of the tongue; Rule 59 (c) refers only 
to the rna tter of affidavits filed in support of a motion 
for a ne\v trial. 
In their brief, defendants assert that Rule 6 (d) is 
applicable, requires the serving of notice and is con-
troling on this controversy (Brief 14) . They also assert 
as a corollary therefrom that the trial court, and this 
court, could not consider the affidavits filed at the time 
of making the motion for continuance. 
The fallacy in this argument is defendants' conten-
tion that Rule 6(d) requires that an oral motion made 
in open court must, despite the inconsistency involved 
and that the rule does not so state, be in writing and filed 
and served ahead of time. The truth is that Rule 6 (d) 
is concerned only with the time involved if a motion is 
a written motion and not one presented in open court. 
It does not purport to require that a motion for a con-
tinuance be a written motion. 
Rule 7 (b) ( 1) provides that "An application to the 
court for an order shall be by motion which, unless made 
during a hearing or trial, shall be in writing, " 
(emphasis added) 
Taken together these two rules simply mean that 
an oral motion made in open court need not be preceded 
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by notice (unless some other rule or statute might so 
require) but where a motion is not one made in open 
court it must be in writing and certain notice given. 
Plaintiff's motion was properly made in open court-no 
notice beforehand was required. 
Defendants further assert that the affidavits filed 
in suport of the motion were untimely and must be 
stricken. This contention fails because affidavits are not 
required to support a motion for continuance despite de-
fendants' suggestion at pages 13 and 14 of their brief 
that such is the case. 
Though defendants cite and quote from Rule 40 (b) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, they fail to indicate that 
the rule contains no requirement of affidavits and they 
further fail to mention that the reporter's note immedi-
ately following the rule establishes that "The motion 
need not be by affidavit as required formerly in the 
statute." The statute referred to is Utah Code Anno. 
1943, 104-23-10 which was repealed when the Rules 
were adopted and which did require affidavits in certain 
instances to support a· motion for continuance. 
The mention in Rule 6 (d) that "When a motion is 
supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with 
the motion; . . . " can, when the entire rule is read, only 
have reference to affidavits in support of motions which 
must be in writing and must be served, not oral motions 
made in open court which, according to the rules need 
not be in writing and need not be served ahead of time. 
Since there is no requirement of advance notice or of 
affidavits, the authorities cited by defendants at pages 
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14· and 15 of their brief are not in point, having been 
decided with reference to the repealed statute or an 
entirely different rule of procedure. Canning v. Star Pub-
lishing Company, 19 F.R.D. 281 (Del. 1956) concerns 
a motion for summary judgment under the federal rules 
\vhich have specific requirements for service of the mo-
tion before the time fixed for hearing. This case is not 
in point. The Utah cases of Lancino v. Smith, 36 Utah 
4:62, 105 P. 914 ( 1909) and McGrath v. Tallent, 7 Utah 
256, 26 P. 574 ( 1891) are cited by defendants in sup-
port of their theory that affidavits must be filed and 
served ahead of time in the case of a motion for a con-
tinuance. Defendants' citations to these cases omit the 
date of the case and they do not tell us that these cases 
were decided under the earlier statutory provision re-
quiring such affidavits. Since this statutory requirement 
is no longer in force, these cases add little to the defend-
ants' position; rather they point out the weakness of 
defendants' argument. 
It would indeed be an unfair and arbitrary rule if 
a motion for continuance could not in a proper case such 
as this one be made in open court. In this instance 
preparations had been made for plaintiff and his Cali-
fornia counsel to travel to Utah for trial (R. 113) and 
only at the last moment was plaintiff, paralyzed from 
the neck down by the accident in controversy, informed 
that he would not be able to attend. The rule advocated 
by defendants would be a temendous boon to those whose 
only interest is the avoidance of payment of just personal 
injury claims because in a case such as this where unfor-
seen matters can arise on short notice it would be abso-
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lutely impossible to give the notice defendants now ask. 
Such an arbitrary rule would shock the conscience of 
any fair-minded man and would violate the fundamental 
rules of due process and fair play. 
Plaintiff's motion for a continuance was properly 
made and although there was no requirement of affi-
davits, affidavits were provided to show the reasons 
for the motion. Despite plaintiff's assertion that this 
motion was timely ( R. 55, 58, 61, 72), defendants' con-
tinued insistence that it was not and that the court could 
not consider it led the trial court into error which must 
no be repeated here. The error induced by defendants 
in this regard can only have had the effect of depriving 
plaintiff of the court's proper consideration of the motion 
and the affidavits in support thereof. For this reason 
alone the judgment must be reversed and plaintiff granted 
a ne\\r trial. 
POINT II. DEFENDANTS' POINT III, BASED 
UPON THE DEAD MAN STATUTE AND THE 
WRONGFUL DEATH ACT, CANNOT BE CON-
SIDERED BY THIS COURT BECAUSE IT WAS 
NEITHER PRESENTED TO NOR PASSED 
UPON BY THE TRIAL COURT BUT IS RAISED 
IMPROPERLY FOR THE FIRST TIME ON 
APPEAL. 
Defendants' Point III rests upon the assumption that 
plaintiff, in fact, had only the evidence of the plaintiff 
himself upon which to go to trial and that either the 
Dead Man Statute (Utah Code Anno. 1953, 78-24-2(3)) 
or the Wrongful Death Act (Utah Code Anno. 1953, 
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7 8-11-12 ) , or both, then functioned to require the trial 
court to dismiss the plaintiff's action. 
In our Point III we will show the substantive fallacies 
in this argument. We are now concerned only with. the 
question of whether this court can or should consider 
these issues at all. The issues raised by these contentions 
of the defendants are neither simple nor few. There are 
complex and intricate fact and law problems involved 
in any controversy concerning the Dead Man Statute. 
There are equally complex and intricate fact and law 
problems involved in any controversy concerning the 
Wrongful Death Act. None of these problems was pre-
sented to the trial court. None of these problems was 
passed upon by the trial court. The record is completely 
devoid of any reference to these many potential issues 
in any shape or form. The trial court had no opportunity 
to hear or determine any of the many-faceted fact and 
law problems such a presentation would entail. 
Whether presented in an argument ostensibly designed 
to uphold the decision of the lower court, or by any other 
device, these many complicated law-fact issues now 
raised by defendants were never presented to the trial 
court, \Vere never passed upon by the trial court and are 
now improperly raised here for the first time on appeal. 
Defendants cite no authority in support of their raising 
of these complex new matters for the first time on appeal. 
Indeed, with the rare exception wherein the court acts 
to prevent an otherwise unpreventable serious miscar-
riage of justice, the rule that an appellate court will not 
entertain matters first raised on appeal is probably the 
most consistently followed of all the salutory rules gov-
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erning either trial or appellate practice. This court had 
an attempt to raise the issue of the Dead Man Statute 
for the first time on appeal presented to it within the 
rela~ively recent past. In disposing of this attempt, the 
court said, in Obradovich v. Walker Bros. Bankers, 80 
Utah 587, 16 P.2d 212, 218 (1932) 
Though we assume the witness because of her 
interest to be incompetent by reason of the statute 
to testify in this case, yet, under the state of the 
record we are satisfied that question is not before 
us. The question not having been raised in the 
trial court, we do not feel at liberty to pass on the 
question now argued by appellant in this court 
for the first time. 
The rule that new matter will not be entertained on 
appeal is in accord with other decisions of this court and 
other courts. 
Huber v. Deep Creek Irrigation Co., 6 Utah 2d 15, 
305 P.2d 478 (1956); U.S. Building & Loan Assn'n v. 
Midvale Home Finance Corp., 86 Utah 522, 46 P.2d 
672 ( 1935) ; Idaho State Bank of Twin Falls, Idaho~ v. 
Hooper Sugar Co., 74 Utah 24, 276 P. 659 (1929) and 
Sandall v. Sandall, 57 Utah 150, 193 P. 1093 ( 1920) 
are representative of the Utah cases. The innumerable 
cases from other courts are collected at 4 C.J.S., Appeal 
and Error, § 228, p. 665, note 70. 
The reasons for refusing to entertain on appeal mat-
ters not raised in or presented to the lower court are 
based on the practical necessity of an orderly administra-
tion of law and on fairness to the trial court and the 
opposite party. To entertain defendants' assertions here 
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would be to make far reaching decisions of fact and la\v 
in a vacuum-without the benefit of either evidence or 
record-without allowing plaintiff an opportunity to pre-
sent his side of the controversy and would deny plaintiff 
his right to a jury trial on these important matters. Ac-
cordingly, the entirety of defendants' arguments con-
cerning the Dead Man Statute and the Wrongful Death 
Act is premature. For these reasons this court must de-
cline to pass upon the issues thus raised for the first time 
on appeal by defendants. 
POINT III. EVEN ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, 
THAT DEFENDANTS' POINT III WERE 
PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT FOR RE-
VIEW, WHICH IT IS NOT, IT WOULD AVAIL 
DEFENDANTS NOTHING BECAUSE ( 1) THE 
CONTENTION THAT PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEl~ 
ADMITTED THAT HE HAD NO EVIDENCE 
OTHER THAN THAT FROM THE PLAINTIFF 
HIMSELF IS A BIASED DISTORTION OF ONE 
COMMENT WRENCHED OUT OF CONTEXT 
AND DOES NOT REFLECT THE TRUTH, (2) 
THE DEAD MAN STATUTE DOES NOT DIS-
QUALIFY THE PLAINTIFF FROM TESTIFY-
ING AND (3) THE WRONGFUL DEATH ACT 
AIDS RATHER THAN HINDERS PLAINTIFF'S 
CASE. 
Challenging defendants' arguments concerning the 
Dead Man Statute and the Wrongful Death Act is not 
to be construed as a waiver of the argument in Point 
II that these matters are not properly before the court 
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for review. Because of the gravity of this matter and 
because these issues were argued at some length in de-
fendants' brief plaintiff feels constrained to answer them 
and requests the courts indulgence. 
The keystone upon which defendants' argument rests 
and without which the remainder of the argument has 
no merit is the assertion raised at page 31 of their brief 
that " ... plaintiff's attorney admitted that the only testi-
mony or evidence supporting the plaintiff's claim was that 
of the plaintiff ( R. 90) . " If this assertion concerning 
evidence is wrong, the remainder of defendants' argu-
ment is valueless. We will show that it is wrong. 
This cited comment of counsel must be considered 
in light of the setting in which it was made. Arrange-
ments and reservations had been made for the plaintiff 
and his California counsel to travel. to Utah for the trial 
when, at the last moment, plaintiff, paralyzed from the 
neck down by the accident in question, was informed by 
his doctors that he would not be able to attend but must 
undergo a trans-uretha section (R. 110, 113). Plaintiff's 
counsel informed court and opposing counsel as rapidly 
as possible of this unexpected turn of events and made 
properly and timely a motion for a reasonable contin-
uance. Upon defendants' repeated insistence that the 
motion was not timely or sufficient, the court denied the 
motion and plaintiff was forced to go to trial. Obviously 
certain elements of plaintiff's case could only be properly 
presented through the plaintiff himself. This would in-
clude evidence concerning the extent of his injuries, pain 
and suffering, and other elements of which he would be 
able to testify regardless of the application or not of the 
10 
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Dead Man Statute. He should be allowed to testify 
as to tnany, if not all, of the independent facts concern-
ing the accident. The cited comment of counsel must 
be considered in light of the comment next preceeding 
it on the same page of the record ( R. 90, line 4) but not 
mentioned in defendants' brief. Counsel said 
I would like the record to show, Mr. Reporter, 
that this particular exhibit, Plaintiff's exhibit No. 
1 which purports to be a deposition of the Plain-
tiff Paul Bairas, is the only sworn testimony of 
the Plaintiff, Paul Bairas, that is available at this 
time. (emphasis added) 
It is clear upon a reading of the record that the comment 
cited by defendants had the same meaning as the com-
ment quoted above but not referred to by defendants. 
In the interest of a fair and honest presentation of 
plaintiff's position to this court we feel compelled to add 
that defendants' assertion that plaintiff had no other 
testimony or evidence is improperly asserted for another 
reason. That reason is that the plaintiff did have other 
witnesses under subpoena. In fact one of the witnesses 
whose names were called by defendants' counsel when 
plaintiff moved for the exclusion of witnesses, Mr. Crosby 
(R. 83), was under the plaintiff's subpoena. Others under 
subpoena were not in the courtroom at that moment. 
Just as defendants felt compelled in their statement of 
facts to recite matters not in the record (and they so 
indicate) ( R. 9, voir dire examination of jurors) so does 
plaintiff feel compelled to bring these matters to the 
court's attention in order that incompleteness of the 
record will not prejudice this court's duty to reach a just 
11 
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decision. Of course, we stand ready to show to this court's 
satisfaction the truth of our assertions concerning other 
witnesses. 
Building upon their erroneous conclusion that the 
only evidence available to plaintiff was that of the 
plaintiff himself, the defendants next argue that the Dead 
Man Statute, Utah Code Anno. 1953, 78-24-2 ( 3), abso-
lutely precludes the use of any or all of this evidence. 
This portion of defendants' argument is also untenable. 
In support of their contention defendants cite four cases, 
one each from Utah, Wyoming, Nevada and Nebraska. 
With all due deference to prior members of this 
court, we respectfully submit that the Utah case, Max-
field v. Sainsbury, 110 Utah 280, 172 P. 2d 122 ( 1946) 
is not precedent for anything in this regard but that the 
entire discussion in the majority opinion and in the con-
curring opinion concerning the Dead Man Statute is, 
unfortunately, only potentially misleading and confusing 
dicta. The case was reversed on the question of the 
validity of a receipt-having no bearing on the Dead 
Man Statute issue. Accordingly defendants' assertion that 
the Maxfield case states the Utah law in this regard 
deserves little weight. 
It is true that the cases from those states which have 
unfortunately been saddled with this blind and senseless 
exception to the generally prevailing rule of no dis-
qualification because of interest are in hopeless conflict. 
Any attempt to reconcile them would be futile. We will 
show, however, that the view advocated by the defend-
ants is not the majority view as they state (Brief 31) but 
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on the contrary is the minority view, and a \\·an1ng 
minority view at that. 
It appears that of the jurisdictions which have ap-
parently considered the question of whether the Dead 
Man Statute should be strictly construed and thus used 
to \vithhold needed evidence in automobile accident 
cases, or liberally construed and thus not used unneces-
sarily to withhold evidence in automobile accident cases, 
only seven (plus possibly one state which construed a 
similar statute concerned with partnership matters) ad-
here to the strict view while the remaining ten favor the 
liberal position. Of the ten favoring the liberal position 
seven of the decisions are within the last eight years while 
only t\vo of the decisions favoring the strict view are 
within the last twenty-one years-they happen to be the 
Nevada and Nebraska cases upon which defendants rely. 
Texas and Alabama have by recent decisions moved from 
the strict interpretation camp to the liberal one. Citations 
to these various authorities will be listed later, and are 
to be found in an exhaustive annotation at 80 A.L.R.2d 
1296. 
Those cases which use the statute to preclude testimony 
to the greatest extent possible give such reasons as ( 1) 
prior cases on other matters have construed "transac-
tion" to include every variety of affairs and it must be 
so construed here; ( 2) the purpose of the statute is to 
equalize and spread the disability whenever possible; 
( 3) mankind is so inherently dishonest and the judicial 
process so faulty that we must deny the survivor a chance 
to speak in order to forestall the looting of estates by 
false claims; ( 4) although "transaction" can be judicially 
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construed to include every variety of affairs, contrary to 
its usual and ordinary meaning, it cannot be construed 
according to its usual and ordinary meaning because so 
to do would be judicial legislation; and ( 5) although 
the harshness and undesirability of this result is recog-
nized by almost all courts and writers only the legislature 
has the power or the responsibility to do anything about it. 
Jurisdictions and rna jor cases representing this strict 
interpretation viewpoint are: Georgia, Rogers v. Carmi-
chael, 58 Ga.App. 343, 198 S.E. 318 ( 1938) dealing 
with a partnership statute; Illinois, VanMeter v. Gold-
farb, 31 7 I Ill. 620, 148 N.E. 391 ( 1925) ; Kentucky, 
Miller v. W alsh"'s A~dministratrix, 240 Ky. 822, 43 S.W. 
2d 42 ( 1931); Nebraska, Re Mueller-'s Estate, 166 Neb. 
376, 89 N.W.2d 137 (1958); Nevada, Zeigler v. Moore_, 
335 P.2d 425 (Nev. 1959); North Carolina, Davis v. 
Pearson, 220 N.C. 163, 16 S.E.2d 655 ( 1941); West Vir-
ginia, Willhide v. Biggs, 118 W.Va. 160, 188 S.E. 876 
(1936); and Wyoming, Stephens v. Short, 41 Wyo. 324, 
285 P. 797 ( 1930). 
On the other hand, the decisions representing the 
majority and growing view that the rule is either inap-
plicable to automobile accidents or must be liberally con-
strued so as not to exclude evidence of the facts and 
occurrences of the accident voice such reasons as: ( 1 ) 
this provision is an anachronism persisting, truly, from 
the dark past when all parties in interest were disqualified 
as witnesses; ( 2) as such it is a harsh rule, and since 
all states have adopted liberal party testimony admis-
sion statutes, this rule is an exception only to the general 
rule and the general rule must be liberally construed 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and this exception strictly construed in order to accom-
plish the primary objective of the general statute; ( 3) 
there is no reason to believe that justice is done by deny-
ing this testimony and that in fact many more honest 
claims are unjustly defeated than unjust claims are 
th\varted; ( 4) the guarantees of cross examination are 
adequate and effective to prevent fraudulent claims; 
( 5) by its plain and usual meaning "transaction" refers 
to a contractual or other mutual type of negotiation or 
business relationship and not to the independent facts 
of an automobile accident as such; ( 6) that to extend 
the meaning of "transaction" to embrace every type of 
affairs \vould be an unwarranted judicial extension un-
intended by the legislature; ( 7) in any event, it is going 
too far to say that "transaction" applies to any and all 
aspects of an automobile accident; ( 8) the question is 
not whether the matter sounds in contract or in tort 
but \vhether it is a transaction in the usual and ordinary 
meaning of that word; (9) automobile accidents are not, 
as such, transactions, but are independent facts. 
Jurisdictions and major cases representing this more 
liberal viewpoint are: Alabama, Gibson v. McDonald, 
265 Ala. 426, 91 So.2d 679 (1956); Arkansas, Rankin 
v. Morgan, 193 Ark. 751, 102 S.W.2d 552 (1937); 
Florida, Herring v. Eiland, 81 So.2d 645 (Fla. 1955) ; 
Day v. Stickle, 113 So.2d 559 (Fla. App. 1959) ; Iowa, 
Turbot v. Repp, 247 Iowa 69, 72 N.W.2d 565 ( 1955); 
Maryland, Sheneybrook v. Blizzard, 209 Md. 304, 121 
A.2d 218 (1956); New York, McCarthy v. Woolston, 
210 App. Div. 152, 205 N.Y.S. 507 ( 1924) (since af-
firmed by statute); North Dakota, Knoepfle v. Suko, 108 
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N.W.2d 456 (N.D. 1961); Tennessee, Christofiel v. 
johnson, 40 Tenn. App. 197, 290 S.W.2d 215 (1956); 
Texas, Harper v. johnson, 345 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. 1961); 
Wisconsin, Krantz v. Krantz, 211 Wis. 249, 248 N.W. 
155 (1933); Seligman v. Hammond, 205 Wis. 199, 236 
N.W. 115 (1931). 
Except for the Nevada and Nebraska cases, repre-
senting a small to negligible population effect, the strong 
modern trend and the decided weight of authority favor 
the admission of the testimony of a survivor of an auto-
mobile accident as to the facts of the accident. 
Since this court has not previously spoken about the 
Dead Man Statute and automobile accidents, it is un-
fettered by undesirable precedent. It is free to analyze 
the problem in the light of the better reasoned cases 
and the more desirable social results. 
The better analysis of this problem would follow the 
approach below described. 
We have adopted the common law, but only so far 
as it is appropriate to our conditions. Utah Code Anno. 
1953, 68-3-1. The harsh rule that statutes in derogation 
of the common law are to be strictly construed has been 
abolished by Utah Code Anno. 1953, 68-3-2, which pro-
vides that 
The rule of the common law that statutes in 
derogation thereof are to be strictly construed 
has no application to the statutes of this state. 
The statutes establish the laws of this state re-
specting the subjects to which they relate, and 
their provisions and all proceedings under them 
are to be liberally construed with a view to effect 
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the objects of the statutes and to promote jus-
tice .... 
The statute removing generally the disqualification pre-
viously imposed on parties at the common law, Utah 
Code Anno. 1953, 78-24-1, is in derogation of the harsh 
common law rule and is to be liberally construed to 
effect its objects and to promote justice. The exception 
to this statute-the Dead Man Statute, Utah Code Anno. 
1953, 78-24-2 ( 3) -is but a restatement of the harsh 
common law rule which must be strictly construed be-
cause to do otherwise would run afoul of the legislative 
mandate that the general statute be liberaly construed. 
This aspect of the analysis of the problem has been 
adopted by the better reasoned cases. Knoepfle v. Suko, 
108 N.W.2d 456 (N.D. 1961); Harper v. johnson, 345 
S.W.2d 277 (Tex. 1961); Shaneybrook v. Blizzard, 209 
Md. 304, 121 A.2d 218 (1956); Day v. Stickle, 113 So.2d 
559 (Fla. App. 1959); McCarthy v. Woolston, 210 App. 
Div. 152, 205 N.Y.S. 507 (1924); Rankin v. Morgan, 
193 Ark. 751, 102 S.W.2d 552 ( 1937). 
Following this line of thought, the better reasoned 
cases admit tetstimony of the survivor of an automobile 
collision as to all the independent facts of the accident, 
speed, direction of travel, location of vehicles, action of 
drivers, existing conditions and so on. Knoepfle v. Suko, 
108 N.W.2d 456 (N.D. 1961); Harper v. johnson, 345 
S.W.2d 277 (Tex. 1961); Shaneybrook v. Blizzard, 209 
~I d. 304, 121 A.2d 218 ( 1956); Day v. Stickle, 113 So. 
2d 559 (Fla.App. 1959); Rankin v. Morgan, 193 Ark. 
751, 102 S.W.2d 552 (1937); Turbot v. Repp. 247 Iowa 
69, 72 S.W.2d 565 ( 1955); Seligman v. Hammond, 205 
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Wis. 199, 236 N.W. 115 (1931); Gibson v. McDonald, 
265 Ala. 426, 91 So. 2d 679 ( 1956). 
Again, the better reasoned cases dealing with one 
car accidents arrive at the same conclusion, admitting the 
survivor's testimony. Christofiel v. johnson, 40 Tenn.App. 
197, 290 S.W.2d 215 ( 1956); Krantz v. Krantz, 211 Wis. 
249, 248 N.W. 155 ( 1933); Herring v. Eiland, 81 So.2d 
645 (Fla. 1955) ; McCarthy v. Woolston, 210 App. Div. 
152, 205 N.Y.S. 507 ( 1924). 
This line of reasoning would give the statute its nor-
mal and logical interpretation, would admit evidence in 
accord with the mandate of the general statute on ad-
missibility of evidence and would implement what must 
have been the legislative intent, because, while the Dead 
Man Statute may be harsh when applied to business and 
commercial affairs it is not asking the impossible for 
people to put their negotiations and agreements in writ-
ing, but it is asking the impossible to expect them to 
reduce the facts of an automobile accident to an admis-
sible writing. In fact, we respectfully submit, the legis-
lature did not have the independent facts of an automo-
bile accident in mind at all when in 1894 the Dead Man 
Statute exception was enacted in substantially its present 
form. Laws of Utah, 1894, p. 26-27. 
Such minority view cases as those cited by defendants, 
Re Mueller's Estate, 166 Neb. 376, 89 N.W.2d 137 
(1958) and Zeigler v. Moore, 335 P.2d 425 (Nev. 1959) 
have but two arguments in their favor. ( 1) The rule 
they establish is easy of application and ( 2) they keep 
pacified and quiet the vocal insurance lobbies which 
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have no higher motivation than the minimization of just 
claims. Little else can be said in their favor. 
If and when a case involving the Dead Man Statute 
and an automobile accident is properly presented to this 
court, right reason and logic will require that this court 
so construe the statute as to effect the humane and 
socially desirable ends attainable only by admission of 
all evidence available in such cases. 
The final contention made by defendants in this line 
of argument is that, and again assuming no evidence to 
be available other than that of the plaintiff himself, the 
Wrongful Death Act (Utah Code Anno. 1953, 78-11-12) 
compels affirmance of the lower court because of the 
provision in that act that the plaintiff "shall not recover 
judgment except upon some competent satisfactory evi-
dence, other than the testimony of said injured person." 
We have shown that there was evidence available 
other than the testimony of plaintiff himself. Accord-
ingly, even were this contention ripe for appeal, it would 
fail. 
Not only does this provision not assist defendants, 
it assists plaintiff. When it is considered that this is a 
recently enacted statute, the quoted phrase can have had 
no effect intended other than to repeal the disqualifica-
tion in the Dead Man Statute but in so doing to request 
some other independent evidence in corroboration. 
Accordingly, were it ripe for appeal, the Wrongful 
Death Act would not require affirmance but reversal of 
the lower court, which must in any event for other reasons 
be reversed. 
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in the initial brief and in 
this reply brief, plaintiff respectfully submits that the 
trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant 
plaintiff's timely motion for a continuance and in failing 
to grant plaintiff's motion for a change of venue. 
Plaintiff renews the prayer of its initial brief that 
this court reverse or vacate the judgment of the lower 
court and remand this case for a trial on the merits in 
a county free from bias and prejudice, and in any event 
that it be reversed and remanded for a trial on the merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Gardner & Bums 
25 East Lincoln Avenue 
Cedar City, Utah 
Nathan Goller 
91 71 Wilshire Blvd. 
Beverly Hills, California 
Attorneys for the Appellant 
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